Chasidut zu Könige I 18:34
וַיֹּ֗אמֶר מִלְא֨וּ אַרְבָּעָ֤ה כַדִּים֙ מַ֔יִם וְיִֽצְק֥וּ עַל־הָעֹלָ֖ה וְעַל־הָעֵצִ֑ים וַיֹּ֤אמֶר שְׁנוּ֙ וַיִּשְׁנ֔וּ וַיֹּ֥אמֶר שַׁלֵּ֖שׁוּ וַיְשַׁלֵּֽשׁוּ׃
Und er sagte: 'Füllen Sie vier Gläser mit Wasser und gießen Sie es auf das Brandopfer und auf das Holz.' Und er sagte: 'Mach es das zweite Mal';; und sie haben es das zweite Mal getan. Und er sagte:'Mach es das dritte Mal';; und sie haben es das dritte Mal getan.
Mevo HaShearim
Now, regarding the phrase “prophecies which were necessary for the generations,” Rashi165R. Solomon Yitzhaki, Troyes, France. 1040-1105 glosses “to teach repentance or [other] instruction.” What is the nature of this ‘instruction?’166Horaah, from the same Hebrew root as ‘Torah.’ It cannot refer to adding or detracting from the Torah, since the passage states they did not issue such instructions. Nor can it mean that they innovated specific rulings regarding Torah law, using prophecy rather than standard legal reasoning or hermeneutics. For Maimonides167R. Moses b. Maimon, Spain and Egypt, 1135-1206 writes (in the introduction to his Mishnah Torah168Maimonides’ legal magnum opus, a comprehensive codification of Jewish law.): “Know that prophecy is legally inefficacious in interpreting the Torah or extrapolating legal details via the hermeneutical principles. Rather, just as Joshua and Phineas utilized analysis and reasoning, so too did Ravina and Rav Ashi.”169For more on the role of prophecy in halakhic interpretation in Maimonides’ system, see his Laws of the Foundations of the Torah, Chapter 10. Maimonides continues on to explain that the prophet had only the additional capacity [over the sage] to temporarily suspend a Torah law, as did Elijah on Mount Carmel, but no more.170See I Kings 18:34-38 and Talmud Yevamot 90b. If so, in what sense is the prophet’s ‘teaching of repentance or other instruction’ superior to that of any other [authority]?
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